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ABSTRACT 
 
With the concentration of poverty increasing throughout the United States (Kneebone, 
2014) there has been a recent emphasis on mixed-income housing as a means to alleviate this 
issue. By creating housing in one area with pricing for different income levels it is assumed that 
the burden imposed by concentrated poverty will be lowered. Many years and many dollars later 
however, the results of mixed-income housing projects on low-income residents seem to be 
mixed – while some projects have found success, others seem to suggest that it has little to no 
effect. The federal program HOPE VI is one example of efforts to increase the availability of 
mixed-income housing. It is the purpose of this study to decipher whether the administration of 
HOPE VI federal grant money has had an effect on certain economic outcomes within the 
selected metropolitan areas.   
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Introduction 
 
Growing inequality in the United States has captivated the attention of numerous 
organizations, and is part of a growing body of research (“Inequality Organizations, 
Think Tanks, and Academic Centers”). According to 2014 U.S. Census Data, 14.8% of 
the U.S. population lives in poverty, with more than 1 out of every 5 children under the 
age of 18 living in poverty (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor, 2015). Given the U.S.’s 
population, this means that from 2010 onward, over 45 million live in poverty, with an 
estimated 46.7 million in 2014 (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor, 2015).  
The concentration of poverty has also increased in both urban and suburban 
areas. The number of “distressed” neighborhoods, i.e., neighborhoods in which at least 
40% of residents are below the U.S. poverty line, increased by nearly 75% since the 
early 2000s to house an estimated 12.2% of the poor – for those living within a city the 
chances of living in a distressed neighborhood rise to 23% (Kneebone, 2014). Mixed 
income neighborhoods, that is neighborhoods in which housing different income groups 
together is an explicit goal, have come into practice in an effort to decrease the 
concentration of poverty and help lift families out of poverty (“About Hope VI”). The 
purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the federal grants within the HOPE VI 
project, given for the purpose of creating mixed income housing, improved the average 
economic outcomes of individuals living in these areas.  
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Literature Review 
 
Neighborhood Effects and Mixed-Income Housing 
Why we should care about the poor is an ethical and moral matter to many, but 
the concerns on the particulars of poverty, such as who it affects and where, provides 
the guiding force for public policy aimed at taking control of it. The concentration of 
poverty is of particular concern, because of the presumed effects that it has on 
residents and the cycle of poverty in general. The theory of “spatial mismatch” is one 
explanation for the concentration of poverty in urban centers and the resulting ill effects 
it has. It contends that with the end of the industrial era many jobs moved to the 
periphery of cities, or out into the suburbs entirely, and while the wealthier individuals 
were able to follow, this left poorer families in the urban interior with declining work 
opportunities (Kain, 1992; Joseph, 2006). In his work “The Truly Disadvantaged” (1987) 
William J. Wilson argues that the absence of these better-off individuals erodes local 
institutions such as stores, churches, and schools. This dearth of public and private 
resources, arguably, creates a neighborhood where residents are significantly worse off, 
which further contributes to unemployment and other social malaise thereby pulling 
people into a cycle of poverty.   
The latter half of this theory – that the neighborhood itself is a contributing factor 
to poverty, rather than simply being a place where the poor happen to be – is known as 
“neighborhood effects” (Sanbonmatsu et al, 2012), and whether or not these effects in 
fact exist is at the center of the housing reform and poverty debate. If these 
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neighborhoods do in fact contribute to the cycle of poverty then comprehensive 
measures to aid these neighborhoods might be justified. It is on this premise that the 
idea of mixed-income housing as a solution to neighborhood effects began. If the 
problem of poverty is caused, or at least exacerbated, by the social isolation of the poor, 
then the creation of housing where low-income individuals live alongside those who are 
better off might help break the cycle of intergenerational poverty (Joseph, 2006).    
Multiple underlying propositions are used to support the theory of mixed-income 
housing’s efficacy. One is that social networks operate as a form of social capital, the 
presence of wealthier individuals alongside the poorest leads to networking between the 
two classes, thereby giving less well-off individuals access to the information and 
opportunities richer members of society have (Joseph, 2006). However, the assumption 
that proximity will result in significant (and positive) interactions between people of 
differing socio-economic statuses is challenged by studies which detail not only an 
absence of interaction (Tach, 2009), but at times a fundamental underlying tension 
between classes in these situations (Chaskin et al., 2012). Another suggestion is that 
higher-income earners will have a greater effect on social control by contributing to 
informal rules of social order resulting in greater safety, while a third proposes that 
higher income individuals will help create a culture which encourages positive values 
such as higher goal setting or regular employment (Joseph, 2006). Whether this is a 
real effect or if it merely demonstrates a rather offensive perspective on the “culture of 
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poverty” is a hotly contested issue.1 The final supporting theory to be noted here is 
political economy of place, whereby the greater demand for goods and public services 
by richer individuals is more likely to be met with success, as they wield both greater 
economic and political clout (Joseph, 2006). However, while this could positively affect 
the quality of certain shared public goods such as schools and street safety, it could 
also lead to situations in which more wealthy community members successfully 
compete for limited resources which favor their needs and desires (Joseph, et al., 
2007).  
Numerous studies have delved into the different facets of peer effects, which 
details how those around you affect your decisions and outcomes, and found effects in 
certain situations, such as in the case of classmates on academic performance (Burke 
and Sass, 2013; Gottfried, 2012). However, far fewer have explicitly tied peer effects to 
the neighborhood level with regards to things such as employment outcomes. 
Weinberg, Reagan, and Yankow (2004) found some evidence of neighborhood effects, 
with increases in certain social characteristics leading to small percentage increases in 
the number of hours worked. The researchers also found that these neighborhood and 
peer effects had the strongest influence in the “worst” neighborhoods, as well as on 
those who were less educated or who were Hispanic.  
                                                          
1 The “culture of poverty” was a term originally coined by Oscar Lewis, but became incredibly controversial 
following Patrick Moynihan’s (Moynihan, 1965) study which claimed that the issues that plagued inner city black 
families were caused by a “tangle of pathology” stemming from black culture. Often criticized for its lack of 
consideration of structural inequalities it remains a contentious area of debate between sides which argue that the 
only reason for the disparity of achievement between whites and blacks is motivation/values and those that see 
additional factors at play.    
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The above are some of the reasons why it’s been asserted that mixed-income 
housing projects should work, but as has been illustrated, whether these arguments 
result in real effects is in question. Furthermore, arguments have been put forth as to 
whether mixed-income housing is an effective use of funds considering the limited 
amounts of low-income housing, which impoverished individuals far outnumber. A 
recent study completed by the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University 
(2015), found that in 2013 11.2 million extremely low-income renters (earning 30% or 
below the median within an area) were competing for 7.3 million affordable housing 
units. In situations where a mixed-income community is replacing low-income housing 
projects concern over the reduced availability of housing for previous residents is high, 
as is the case in Chicago (Rhodes, 2016).  
As will be discussed in the next section, studies examining mixed-income 
projects have yielded mixed results. That these projects may not work is important from 
a policy perspective considering the amount of effort and money involved, as well as the 
potential to better invest these funds where they will have the greatest impact. From this 
point on I examine the accomplishments of two crucial mobility programs which focused 
on moving individuals into areas of lower poverty concentration, and detail the 
accompanying studies that continue to evolve in their results as time passes.  
The Gautreaux Case 
One of the earliest studies of the effects of mixed-income housing was in fact not 
a project at all, but the result of a successful discrimination suit against the city of 
Chicago by some of its residents. Charging the Chicago Housing Authority and the U.S. 
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Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) with deliberately concentrating 
low income housing within poor, predominantly black neighborhoods, the Gautreaux 
plaintiffs successfully won their suit, and were awarded housing vouchers to move to 
wealthier suburbs with communities that were no more than 30% black (Gill, 2012; 
Rosenbaum, 1995). Though the legal battle itself began in 1966, the transition of these 
families to the suburbs of Chicago lasted over twenty years, from 1976 to 1997, with 
some 7,100 families slowly making the move (Gill, 2012). The effects on the participants 
of Gautreaux were impressive, with higher employment outcomes (Pokin, et al. 1993) 
and findings that census tract placement was predictive of future AFDC (Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children) receipts (Rosenbaum and DeLuca, 2000). The results for 
participants in Gautreaux would later provide the impetus for further projects such as 
the Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing study, where thousands of disadvantaged 
households were provided with housing vouchers to move to new neighborhoods.  
Despite its potentially promising results there are criticisms of Gautreaux. The 
screening process for the program, in addition to the low number of families that actually 
managed to move once they had passed all the preliminaries (about 20%), arguably 
introduces selection bias where families that managed to move could be judged to be 
“exceptional” rather than the typical (Popkin et al, 2000). Additionally, information on the 
dropouts from the program is unavailable, and while Rosenbaum (2010) argues that 
there could be good reasons as well as bad for this, it remains an unresolved issue. 
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Moving to Opportunity Study 
Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing (MTO) was an experiment performed by 
HUD from 1994-1998 and carried out by the housing authorities of five separate cities: 
Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City (Sanbonmatsu et al, 
2011). Three different groups, all of which elected to participate in a lottery awarding 
housing vouchers, comprised the study. The first was the experimental group which 
received mobility counseling and Section 8 housing vouchers, but could only use them 
to relocate to neighborhoods with a poverty level of less than 10%. The second group 
also received Section 8 housing vouchers, but no neighborhood restrictions were 
applied, and no counseling was provided. The final group acted as the control, and as 
such did not receive housing vouchers.  However, members of this group continued to 
receive the assistance of programs in which they had already been enrolled.  
In the initial analysis of MTO certain results were disappointing in contrast to 
those found in Gautreaux. No increases in educational, employment, or income 
outcomes were found (Sanbonmatsu et al, 2011; Sanbonmatuse et al, 2012; Katz et al, 
2001),  indicating a lack of improvement in economic self-sufficiency. However, there 
were other indicators that showed that there were indeed positive effects on participants 
in other areas of life. Done two years after the conclusion of MTO, one study found a 
decline in behavioral problems and injuries in children (Katz et al, 2001). Two other 
studies done on the long-term effects found increased measurements of feeling safe, 
and lowered rates of depression, diabetes, and obesity as compared to those in the 
control group (Sanbonmatsu et al, 2012; Sanbonmatsu et al, 2011). On these findings 
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alone it could be said that though MTO failed to increase economic self-sufficiency, it 
was successful in some part by virtue of its positive effects on health.  
The above studies do not represent the final word on the MTO debate, as new 
research has provided other evidence on long term outcomes. One of the most recent 
studies looked at the long-term impact on children who participated in the MTO study, 
and found the outcome to be significant and positive, not only in health and well-being, 
but also in economic measures (Chetty, Hendren, and Katz, 2015). Children who moved 
before the age of 13 were found to have incomes that were on average 31% higher than 
their same-aged counterparts of the control group (Chetty, Hendren, and Katz, 2015). 
Additionally, they were more likely to go to college and more likely to attend a better 
college. It should be noted, though, that children who were over 13 when the move was 
made experienced negative effects, which the authors hypothesized to be a 
combination of less time spent in the improved neighborhood, and also of disruptive 
effects that occur during a move (Chetty, Hendren, and Katz, 2015).  
Another study aims at tackling the issue of selection bias present in MTO. 
Former studies have compared the control and experimental groups, but it has been 
reasoned that the members of the control group, who simply failed to be selected for a 
housing voucher, likely possess characteristics that would contribute to success above 
the norm in any case. As these individuals are likely to be more motivated and active in 
their attempts to protect both themselves and their children from the effects of high 
poverty areas as compared to others, the true difference in outcomes between what 
could be called the “typical resident” and the experimental group from MTO could be 
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even larger. Following this logic, the study’s initial results show that children who were 
forced to move to better areas following low-income housing demolition had earnings 
that were 16% higher than those who stayed, and were 9% more likely to be employed 
(Chyn, 2016). Though these are only preliminary results the findings are compelling and 
provide insight into the magnitude of the ill effects of “bad” neighborhoods.  
Criticisms on the structure of MTO as a reason for the lack of improvement in 
adult economic self-sufficiency – especially when compared to Gautreaux – also exist. 
Clampet-Lundquist and Massey (2008) argued that it was an ineffective measure due to 
its design and implementation, which failed to control for things such as length of time in 
the new neighborhoods, and the type of neighborhood moved to beyond that it was low-
poverty. Though many of the neighborhoods that MTO participants moved to were 
initially below 10% poverty, by 2000 the number of impoverished households had risen, 
on average, by 5.8% to 13.6% (compared to 8.6% for integrated neighborhoods), a 
likely indicator that these neighborhoods were not as stable or advantageous as had 
been previously believed (Clampet-Lundquist and Massey, 2008). Participants were not 
required to stay in their new neighborhood for longer than a year, and many of them 
cycled back to their old neighborhoods, meaning that the length of exposure to the 
treatment was short. By comparing these facts with the results of Gautreaux, Clampet-
Lundquist and Massey (2008) posit that one of the major reasons MTO failed to 
increase economic self-sufficiency was its emphasis on placing individuals based on 
poverty measures rather than the neighborhoods’ levels of racial integration (recall that 
Gautreaux specifically moved families to low-minority neighborhoods). As it has been 
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noted by Aliprantis and Kolliner (2015) and Clampet-Lundquist and Massey (2008) the 
participants of MTO by and large moved to predominantly black neighborhoods this is 
an important distinction – it’s quite possible that the new neighborhoods which these 
participants moved to lacked in a variety of important public goods that impacted 
success including, but not limited to, schooling (Aliprantis and Kolliner, 2015). 
Aliprantis and Kolliner (2015) also analyzed whether the control group’s move to 
a lower poverty neighborhood coincided with an improvement in neighborhood quality. 
While the neighborhoods that participants moved to had lower levels of poverty many 
were found to be racially segregated (majority black neighborhoods in this context) and 
had lower levels of employment, income, and education than integrated neighborhoods 
(Clampet-Lundquist and Massey, 2008). Specifically in the case of educational 
attainment it was found that in many cases black low-poverty neighborhoods were 
comparable to white high-poverty neighborhoods (Aliprantis and Kolliner, 2015). With 
these measurements of lower attainment documented they argued that throughout the 
MTO study low rates of neighborhood poverty had been incorrectly assumed to be 
substitutable for quality.  
HOPE VI 
Though Gautreaux and MTO represent comprehensive studies of mixed-income 
housing and the presence of neighborhood effects, they are not the only mixed-income 
housing projects that have been implemented.  For example, the ultimate goal of the 
HOPE VI HUD program, launched in 1992, is to transform public housing using a variety 
of different tactics, including replacing severely distressed low-income housing projects 
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with mixed-income housing. HUD began granting awards to different housing 
authorities, with over $6 billion in grants awarded to hundreds of different projects 
throughout the country (“About HOPE VI”). While there are different segments within the 
HOPE VI funding, we focus on the “Revitalization Grants” which can be used to 
rehabilitate and fix older housing, demolish and create new mixed-income housing in its 
place, acquire sites for future construction, or provide supportive services for residents 
(“About HOPE VI”). However, as with the MTO study, there is ongoing debate as to 
whether these projects have reduced the poverty rate (Darcy, 2010; Fraser, Chaskin, 
and Bazuin, 2013). As one group of researchers note, part of the issue at hand is an 
overall lack of clarity regarding specifics. That is, the vast scope of the HOPE VI 
projects necessitate allowing the individual housing authorities an enormous amount of 
decision making and implementation power, resulting at times in sub-par attempts and 
outcomes (Popkin, et al, 2004). With a lack of clear guidelines and definitions as to what 
mixed-income housing should entail (Levy, McDade, and Dumlao, 2010), the results are 
inconsistent spanning a variety of different philosophies and approaches.   
Others fault not just the administration of the HOPE VI program, and other 
projects similar to it, but the approach itself. Fraser and Kick (2007) propose that these 
programs are flawed from the start due to their emphasis on place-based results, rather 
than people-based benefits, and that by focusing only on the housing, numerous 
obstacles that contribute to circumstances of poverty are being overlooked. They also 
mention the competing goals of different members and organizations that participate in 
these efforts, which can result in an inability to function together, and poor 
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communication. Joseph (2006) also touches on this topic, as he posits that perhaps the 
reason that many of these neighborhoods have failed to help individuals living in poverty 
is that they neglected to provide crucial supportive services, instead expecting simple 
proximity to higher income demographics and the goods and services they would 
generate, to be enough. 
In sum, the challenges to success for mixed-income projects are many, but as 
the Gautreaux and Moving to Opportunity studies show, it has not been without gains. 
Nonetheless, these issues are important to keep in mind in the future construction of 
poverty alleviating measures.   
Research Question 
While health benefits from initiatives involving reducing poverty concentration 
appear to be significant, the ambiguity of outcomes on adult economic self-sufficiency 
raises questions as to whether these initiatives are an effective method to reduce 
poverty. With significant government funding being allocated to the creation of mixed-
income communities it is imperative to ask whether the goals of poverty alleviation are 
being fulfilled. This research study asks the following:  Do HOPE VI grants alter the 
economic outcomes of the communities that receive them, and do the effects vary the 
greater the poverty rate in 2005, the year in which this study begins?  
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Data  
 
 Because the research question focuses on mixed-income communities, a 
selection of these neighborhoods is necessary. Sample areas were drawn from HUD’s 
list of communities that have received money for such projects from the time period 
2005-2013 (“HOPE VI Revitalization Grants”). Table 1 provides a list of the 
municipalities included in my study.  
Table 1: HOPE VI Grants 
Development State, City 
Year 
Awarded  
Housing 
Authority 
Amount 
Awarded 
Metarea 
Code 
South Lincoln 
Colorado, 
Denver 
2010 
HA of the City 
and County of 
Denver 
22,000,000        2,083  
Michigan Court and 
Flossie Riley 
Florida, Fort 
Myers 
2005 
HA of the City of 
Fort Myers 
20,000,000        2,700  
Bluegrass/Aspendale 
Kentucky, 
Lexington 
2005 
Lexington-
Fayette Urban 
County HA 
20,000,000        4,280  
Sheppard Square 
 Kentucky, 
Louisville 
2005 
Housing 
Authority of 
Louisville 
22,000,000        4,520  
Arthur A. Blumeyer 
Missouri, St. 
Louis 
2010 
St. Louis 
Housing 
Authority 
7,829,750        7,040  
Boulevard Homes 
North 
Carolina, 
Charlotte 
2009 
HA of the City of 
Charlotte 
20,900,000        1,521  
Delona Gardens and 
Campbell Terrace 
North 
Carolina, 
Fayetville 
2007 
Fayetteville 
Metropolitan HA 
20,000,000        2,560  
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Edgewood Homes Ohio, Akron 2005 
Akron 
Metropolitan 
Housing 
Authority 
19,250,000             80  
Riverview 
Tennessee, 
Kingsport 
2006 
Kingsport 
Housing and 
Redevelopment 
Authority 
11,900,000        3,662  
Magnolia Gardens 
Texas, 
Beaumont 
2006 
HA of the City of 
Beaumont 
20,000,000           841  
Westpark 
Washington, 
Bremerton 
2008 
HA of the City of 
Bremerton 
20,000,000        1,150  
Sheridan Terrace 
Washington 
D.C.  
2007 
District of 
Columbia HA 
20,000,000        8,840  
 
For the 2005 to 2013 time period, I limit my study to areas where  a HOPE VI grant was 
awarded and the area in the Current Population Survey (CPS) was identified (King, et 
al., 2010). Communities receiving a HOPE VI grant (“Development” column in Table 1) 
were linked to a municipality observable in the CPS (“Metarea” column in Table 1) 
resulting in 12 municipalities that were included in the analysis. The CPS contains key 
socio-demographic that permit an in-depth look at the composition of different 
metropolitan areas. Specifically, unemployment, household income, public assistance, 
Medicaid use, poverty levels, migration, and high school dropout rates were used to 
determine the relationship between mixed income communities and the economic self-
sufficiency of the impoverished. Data was limited to household heads, and the 
information contained in this paper reflects their characteristics.  
In order to create the variables describing the characteristics of the individual 
municipalities for 𝑌𝑚𝑡 (see Table 2) the CPS data obtained using the IPUMS database 
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(King, et al., 2010) was transformed into the variables used in this study. Certain 
observations within the sample were dropped due to incompatibility with the research 
question’s needs, such as secondary members within the household (household heads 
only were used). The original variables empstat (employment status), hhincome 
(household income), incwelfr (welfare income), himcaid (Medicaid use), offpov (poverty 
line), migrate1 (migration, whether someone changed residences in the past year), and 
educ99 (educational attainment) were changed to create binary variables as listed in 
Table 2 and described below.   
Table 2: CPS Variables 
Variable from IPUMS Variable Created  
Name Description  Name  
EMPSTAT 
Part of labor force 
and employed employed 
HHINCOME 
Total household 
income 
hhincome 
*kept as same* 
INCWELFR 
Pretax welfare 
income publicassist 
HIMCAID 
Whether person was 
covered by Medicaid 
in previous year  medicaid 
OFFPOV 
Labels as those 
below poverty line, 
above, and those 
"not in universe".  povertyline 
MIGRATE1 
Whether person has 
changed residences 
within past year.  migrate 
EDUC99 
Indicates the highest 
level of educational 
attainment.  dropout 
 
For each new binary variable the original variables were taken and simplified to a 
yes or no question, with a value of 0 for no, and 1 for yes. For example the original 
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variable of empstat (for employment status) listed multiple answers beyond a simple 
“yes” or “no” for employment with answers such as “unemployed, experienced worker” 
and “unemployed, new worker”. The single exception to the creation of these dummy 
variables is household income (hhincome) which remains a quantitative value, giving 
income rather than being an indicator variable. When individuals had missing 
information the observation was dropped from the sample. Each observation was then 
sorted by metropolitan area and year and then collapsed to an individual entry within the 
data set. This resulted in a new data set containing the means of each of these 
variables within their year and metropolitan area. For the binary variables, each variable 
in the collapsed data set represents the percentage of household heads in a metro area 
in each year with a value of 1. For household income, it is the average household 
income in each metro area in each year.  
Next, since the year of the award date is needed, a separate data set was 
created from Table 1, which lists the municipalities, their metropolitan area code, and 
the award date. The CPS data set and the grant data set were then merged by met 
area.  
The last step before performing the analysis was the creation of the HOPE and 
intxn variables. The HOPE variable is equal to zero for every year before and one for 
every year after the HOPE VI grant is awarded. The HOPE variable has a value of 0 for 
the year when the award is given. While this results in a timing mismatch of some 
months from when the project grant was received and when the HOPE variable 
registers in the affirmative as a value of 1  it is hypothesized that the grant money takes 
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time to take effect, and as a result in this study is compensated for with the time lag. 
The intxn variable which was created for use in Model 3, is an interaction effect between 
high poverty areas and the HOPE variable to determine whether differing levels of initial 
poverty change the effects of the HOPE grant.  
Summary statistics of the variables’ averages over the metropolitan areas are 
contained in Table 3. From this table we can see that the communities that receive 
HOPE VI grants are varied, with some having relatively high poverty rates (31.25%) and 
low employment rates (34.29%) others quite the opposite.  
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
HHIncome 67364.42 13545.33 42863.44 107377.3 
Employed .6376963 .0805404 .3428572 .7773678 
Public Assist .012573 .0216828 0 .1764706 
Medicaid .0841437 .0511592 0 .3529412 
Povertyline .1312597 .0471204 .0217391 .3125 
Migrate .130694 .0462026 .0333333 .2542373 
Dropout .120422 .0558129 .0208333 .3714286 
HOPE .6759259 .4702098 0 1 
intxn .2037037 .4046288 0 1 
year 2009 2.594026 2005 2013 
N 108    
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Models 
 
Model 1 
 The effect of HOPE VI grants on municipal outcomes is examined using three 
models. The baseline model is represented by equation (1), and is given by:  
𝑌𝑚𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐻𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚𝑡 (1) 
As the focus of this project is on economic self-sufficiency, the dependent variables, 𝑌𝑚𝑡, 
are municipal averages of the household head’s current employment status, average 
household income, rate of public assistance use, rate of Medicaid use, percentage 
below the poverty line, average migration rate2, and high school dropout rates in 
municipality m in year t. HOPEmt is an indicator equal to one if municipality m received a 
HOPE VI grant in the year before year t, and remains equal to one in for all years past 
that point. That is, the HOPE variable has a value of 1 when the current year is after the 
year awarded date. With this regression, the coefficient estimate,of 𝛾1 provides a test of 
the relationship between the grant and these other outcomes without controlling for any 
other factors.  
                                                          
2 The migration rate of individuals of who moved within the state, but to a different county, is used to 
gauge whether being awarded a HOPE VI grant leads to an increase in migration out of the 
municipality due to any potential effects of reduced housing availability.   
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Model 2 
In order to control for other factors in a straightforward way, I add municipality 
and time fixed effects as shown in equation (2).  
𝑌𝑚𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐻𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑚𝑡 + 𝑀𝑚 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚𝑡 (2) 
Mm and Tt are for municipal and time fixed effects which will control for natural variation 
between cities and years which could lead to observed differences in the effects of the 
HOPE grant when it is not the true cause. The coefficient of interest is 𝛾1, which 
measures whether the outcome variables (𝑌𝑚𝑡) changed after the grants were 
introduced. Ԑmt is an error term. 
Model 3 
Next, I examined whether HOPE VI grants alter the average characteristics of 
municipalities differentially depending on the poverty rate in the municipality before the 
grant is administered. This model is presented in equation (3).  
𝑌𝑚𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑚 ∗ 𝐻𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑚𝑡 + 𝑀𝑚 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚𝑡 (3) 
The 𝐻𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑚𝑡 indicator and 𝑌𝑚𝑡 are measured as in equation (1). The variable 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑚 is 
a measure of the percentage of individuals below the poverty line in 2005, a period of 
time before the HOPE VI grant is made. The coefficient of interest is β2, which 
measures whether the outcome variables (𝑌𝑚𝑡) changed differentially by poverty status 
after the grants were introduced. As in equation (2) Mm and Tt are municipal and time 
fixed effects and Ԑmt is the error term.  
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 For this model the creation of an interaction effect between the 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑚 and 
𝐻𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑚𝑡 was necessary, predicated by producing the 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑚 variable itself. In order to 
do this I define high poverty as metropolitan areas that were below the 25th percentile of 
the povertyline measure in the year 2005. Using the Povertym  and the HOPEmt 
variables,  the interaction variable, labeled intxn, was created.   
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Results 
 
The results of the different regressions are summarized in the tables below. For 
Model 1 (results seen in Table 4), which regressed each of the seven dependent 
variables (Table 2) against the HOPE variable, the HOPE variable is statistically 
significant for employment, Medicaid use, and the poverty rate. The signs for these 
variables shows that after the application of a HOPE grant there are lower levels of 
employment, higher levels of Medicaid use, and residents are more likely to be above 
the poverty line. The results of lower levels of employment, but reduced poverty rate are 
contradictory and the most likely explanation for this discrepancy is the simplicity of 
Model 1, which compares the average outcomes of the metropolitan areas before and 
after the grant was given. Failing to control for time and area fixed effects means that 
the individual characteristics of the areas are not taken into account, and natural 
changes over time in these variables are not accounted for.   
Table 4: Model 1 Regression 
 HHIncome Employed PublicAssist Medicaid PovertyLine Migrate Dropout 
HOPE -1571.00 -0.06*** 0.00 0.02* 0.04*** 0.00 -0.00 
 (2793.819) (0.016) (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) 
        
Constant 68426.31*** 0.68*** 0.01** 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 
 (2296.930) (0.013) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Adjusted R2 -0.01 0.10 -0.00 0.03 0.13 -0.01 -0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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For Models 2 and 3, time and area fixed effects are used in the regressions to 
control for changes within a year that are common across all metro areas, and the 
individual characteristics of metropolitan areas that are fixed over the sample period. 
The omitted group is the area of Akron, Ohio and the year 2005.3 In Model 2 (results in 
Table 5), the coefficient estimates for the HOPE variable are no longer statistically 
significant, though the magnitude of the estimates for employed, Medicaid, and poverty 
line are similarly signed as in Model 1. That the statistical significance disappears once 
one controls for fixed effects suggests that the HOPE VI grants are unlikely to be 
underlying the observed changes in these average outcomes.  
 
Table 5: Model 2 Regression 
 HHIncome Employed PublicAssist Medicaid PovertyLine Migrate Dropout 
HOPE 283.71 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 (2535.257) (0.017) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
        
Year 2005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
        
Year 2006 6323.81* 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (2994.461) (0.020) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
        
Year 2007 7041.19* 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (3139.986) (0.021) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
        
Year 2008 5785.63 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02 
 (3333.063) (0.023) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
        
Year 2009 6515.41 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
 (3445.013) (0.023) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) 
        
Year 2010 9885.15** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 (3565.977) (0.024) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
        
Year 2011 8412.47* -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.02 
                                                          
3 This is why coefficient estimates and standard errors for Akron, OH and the year 2005 are reported as 
zeros in Tables 5 and 6. 
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 (3831.470) (0.026) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
        
Year 2012 11248.81** -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.05* 0.04 -0.03 
 (3831.470) (0.026) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
        
Year 2013 11398.45** -0.03 -0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02 
 (3831.470) (0.026) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
        
Akron, Ohio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
        
Beaumont, 
Texas 
-6593.92 -0.07** -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.07*** 0.08*** 
 (3329.093) (0.023) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
        
Bremerton, 
Washington 
16954.50*** -0.01 -0.02* -0.05** -0.05** 0.02 -0.03 
 (3423.109) (0.023) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
        
Charlotte, 
North 
Carolina 
7266.65* 0.05* -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 0.06** 0.06** 
 (3503.304) (0.024) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
        
Denver, 
Colorado 
19208.76*** 0.08** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.05* 0.02 
 (3603.791) (0.024) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) 
        
Fayetville, 
North 
Carolina 
-695.10 0.00 -0.02* -0.01 0.00 0.07*** 0.02 
 (3364.657) (0.023) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
        
Fort Myers, 
Florida 
-6259.69 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.04* 0.06** 
 (3317.153) (0.022) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
        
Kingsport, 
Tennessee 
-9928.68** -0.16*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.05** 0.05** 0.14*** 
 (3329.093) (0.023) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
        
Lexington, 
Kentucky 
-565.02 0.06* -0.02 -0.03* -0.01 0.09*** 0.03 
 (3317.153) (0.022) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
        
Louisville, 
Kentucky 
-2161.92 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.04* 0.05* 
 (3317.153) (0.022) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
        
St. Louis, 
Missouri 
6523.80 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (3603.791) (0.024) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) 
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Washington 
D.C. 
29556.57*** 0.06* -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.03 
 (3364.657) (0.023) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
        
Constant 55329.28*** 0.66*** 0.02** 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 
 (3075.890) (0.021) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.65 0.12 0.48 0.38 0.25 0.50 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Model 3 expands on the framework of Model 2 by incorporating an interaction 
effect which tests whether the HOPE VI grant has a different effect when the initial 
levels of poverty in an area are greater. The results can be seen in Table 6, and as with 
Model 2, the main effect of HOPE is not found to be statistically significant for any of the 
dependent variables. While not statistically significant, the main effect estimates for 
Medicaid and Poverty Line are almost identical to those for Model 2. In contrast, the 
interaction effect is statistically significant for employment and the poverty line. These 
estimates suggest that higher poverty areas experience declines in employment and in 
the poverty rate after the administration of the HOPE grant relative to less poverty 
dense areas prior to the grant.  These two estimates appear at odds, a finding which I 
discuss further in the next section.  
 
Table 6: Model 3 Regression 
 HHIncome Employed PublicAssist Medicaid PovertyLine Migrate Dropout 
HOPE 46.71 0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 
 (2633.258) (0.017) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) 
        
intxn 1482.54 -0.07** -0.02 -0.03 -0.05* 0.04 0.01 
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 (4156.061) (0.027) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
        
Year 2005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
        
Year 2006 6155.72* 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 (3046.262) (0.020) (0.009) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) 
        
Year 2007 6912.59* 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (3176.378) (0.021) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
        
Year 2008 5572.99 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02 
 (3402.531) (0.022) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
        
Year 2009 6322.52 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
 (3504.394) (0.023) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
        
Year 2010 9712.01** -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (3616.716) (0.024) (0.010) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
        
Year 2011 8278.83* -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.02 
 (3869.015) (0.025) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
        
Year 2012 11115.17** -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.05* 0.04 -0.03 
 (3869.015) (0.025) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
        
Year 2013 11264.81** -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.02 
 (3869.015) (0.025) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
        
Akron, Ohio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
        
Beaumont, 
Texas 
-5302.44 -0.13*** -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 0.11*** 0.09** 
 (4929.795) (0.032) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) 
        
Bremerton, 
Washington 
18193.32*** -0.07* -0.04** -0.07** -0.10*** 0.06* -0.02 
 (4888.444) (0.032) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
        
 
Charlotte, 
North 
Carolina 
 
 
 
8479.13 
 
 
 
-0.01 
 
 
 
-0.04* 
 
 
 
-0.03 
 
 
 
-0.05* 
 
 
 
0.09*** 
 
 
 
0.07* 
 (4893.947) (0.032) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
        
Denver, 
Colorado 
20394.91*** 0.02 -0.03* -0.05 -0.06* 0.09** 0.04 
 (4916.884) (0.032) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) 
        
Fayetville, 
North 
-418.31 -0.01 -0.02* -0.02 -0.01 0.07*** 0.02 
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Carolina 
  
(3469.539) 
(0.023) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
        
Fort Myers, 
Florida 
-4941.88 -0.10** -0.03* -0.06* -0.06* 0.08** 0.07* 
 (4976.212) (0.032) (0.014) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) 
        
Kingsport, 
Tennessee 
-8637.20 -0.23*** 0.00 0.08** 0.01 0.09** 0.15*** 
 (4929.795) (0.032) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) 
        
Lexington, 
Kentucky 
752.79 -0.01 -0.03* -0.06* -0.06* 0.13*** 0.04 
 (4976.212) (0.032) (0.014) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) 
        
Louisville, 
Kentucky 
-2161.92 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.04* 0.05* 
 (3333.918) (0.022) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
        
St. Louis, 
Missouri 
7709.95 -0.04 -0.03* -0.03 -0.06* 0.05 0.03 
 (4916.884) (0.032) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) 
        
Washington 
D.C. 
30821.72*** -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06* 0.05 0.04 
 (4900.436) (0.032) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) 
        
Constant 54363.94*** 0.71*** 0.04** 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.05* 0.08*** 
 (4108.577) (0.027) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.67 0.13 0.49 0.42 0.27 0.49 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Discussion 
  
The regression results suggest that overall the HOPE VI grant money does not 
appear to have much of a relationship to the economic outcomes selected for this study. 
Though Model 1 found statistically significant effects, these results did not hold true 
when the area and time fixed effects were accounted for in Model 2. Therefore, in the 
context of this study, the fixed factors that are particular to a certain area or year appear 
to be more important in influencing economic outcomes than the HOPE VI grant money. 
In Model 3 the results of the interaction effects seemingly contradict each other, 
indicating that in areas of higher poverty the HOPE grant causes declines in 
employment and in the poverty line. . 
Limitations 
 The ambiguous conclusions drawn from this study are likely due to substantial 
limitations, primarily stemming from a lack of data at precise geographical areas. Ideally 
the dependent variables would have been isolated to smaller areas, perhaps within 
census tracts, in order to more accurately identify the exact communities that received 
grants. However, the smallest area available in the public use CPS data is a 
metropolitan area. This means that  the effects of the grant money, which was given to 
far smaller communities within these areas, is assumed to have a strong enough effect 
on the metropolitan area as to influence its average economic outcomes. In reality, 
considering the size of these areas and the amount of grant money, this seems highly 
improbable.  
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 The sample size itself is an additional issue. Constraints on what data was 
available where and when in the CPS resulted in a selection of only 12 municipalities. In 
the future by examining some of the other 200 communities which have received this 
grant the results would have improved accuracy.  
 Time is an additional factor to be considered when attempting to observe the 
effects of the HOPE VI grant money. While a small time lag amounting to less than a 
year was instituted in the calculation of the HOPE variable (HOPE had a value of 1 if it 
was the year after the grant award date) it is possible that further time would be 
necessary for the effects of the grant money to manifest, whether from actually putting 
the funding to use in the form of development and construction, or for the surrounding 
environment to have an effect on the inhabitants.  Even for the earliest periods used in 
this study short-term outcomes are the only observable results. Additionally, as was 
seen in numerous MTO studies the strongest effects on economic indicators were for 
the children who participated in the study – if this holds true in future cases change is 
more likely to be seen in the long-run, and an examination of short-term effects may 
lead one to falsely conclude that there is no effect. Taken together, these limitations 
suggest that given a smaller observed area and a more flexible measure of the HOPE 
grant to allow for lagged effects we may have had different results.  
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Conclusion 
 
Ultimately, this study found ambiguous economic effects of the HOPE grant 
money on the selected dependent economic outcomes. It is worthwhile at this point in 
time to consider what this ultimately means for mixed-income communities. Though this 
study is far from conclusive it suggests that we may be able to learn more from a more 
appropriate analysis, using data at a more narrowly defined geographic area. At the 
same time it does not refute the findings of analysis of other housing related 
experiments such as Moving to Opportunity, which have shown that the health 
outcomes, both physical and mental, were improved when participants were moved to 
lower poverty areas. Consequently, even if the current analysis failed to find strong 
evidence that mixed-income communities improves average economic measures of a 
municipality, it could provide a basic framework for future analysis.  
In future studies, taking into account the limitations of using public use CPS data, 
accessing restricted use data through one of the Federal Statistical Research Data 
Centers (RDCs) would prove valuable in improving accuracy and validity of the model. 
Before decisions can be made regarding the future of these programs additional 
research needs to be completed.  
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